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Abstract 
This study examines the implications of practical reason for entrepreneurial activities. Our study is based on Thomas 
Aquinas’ interpretation of such virtue, with a particular focus on the partition of practical reason in potential parts such 
as synesis, or common sense, and gnome, or perspicacity. Since entrepreneurial acts and actions deal with extremely 
uncertain situations, we argue that only this perspicacity, as the ability of correctly judging in exceptional cases, has the 
power to find wisdom under such blurred conditions. Perspicacity frees entrepreneurs from their cognitive schemata 
rendering them able to be truly entrepreneurial. Based on this vision and thanks to a semantic analysis of the meaning of 
the Greek word gnome, we construct an interpretative model for entrepreneurial judgment composed of three 
dimensions, specifically, knowledge-cognitive, external-affective, and personal-reflective. The model highlights how a 
‘successful’ entrepreneurial judgment is also such from a holistic point of view. 
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Introduction 
Business ethics scholars have progressively increased their interest towards entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial actions (Novak, 1993; Cornwall and Naughton, 2003; George, 2003; Dew and Sarasvathy, 
2007; Arjoon, 2008; Clarke and Holt, 2010; Melé, 2010). Virtue ethics is the theoretical lens used in a 
substantial number of contributions that study such phenomena; in particular, analyses of practical reason 
(PR), a translation of the classical concept of phronesis, or in the later Latin tradition prudentia, are largely 
applied (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005; Hartman, 2008; Dunham, 2010). Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics 
(henceforth NE) regards this fundamental habitus of character as the capacity to find the proper means to 
reach particular ends, by interpreting the contingencies of the issue and then ordering best actions (NE, VI, 5, 
1138b24ff; Broadie, 1991; Westberg, 1994). We want to contribute to the debate about PR and 
entrepreneurship using the Thomistic interpretation of this virtue contained in Aquinas’ principal treatise 
Summa Theologiae (henceforth S.Th).  
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In order to understand the importance of PR in the entrepreneurial world, we may consider Schumpeter’s 
affirmation that a fundamental characteristic of entrepreneurship is “the capacity of seeing things in a way 
which afterwards proves to be true, […] grasping the essential fact, discarding the unessential” (Schumpeter; 
1934, p.85). This virtue should be even sharper in leaders who need to understand best actions for 
themselves and at the same time for their community, i.e. their company, and for society at large, i.e. societal 
and stakeholders’ welfare, or the common good (Freeman 1994; George, 2003; Benedict XVI, 2009; Melé, 
2009). We focus our attention on changing environments, crisis moments and other circumstances where 
uncertainty is ‘high’ or rather that paradigm of such uncertainty is changing. An entrepreneurial orientation 
or mindset is therefore required to better respond to such situations (Penrose, 1959; Covin and Slevin, 1991; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Teece et al., 1997). 
In many cases, these entrepreneurial actions, i.e. actions done with an entrepreneurial orientation, have a 
strong morphogenetic power, which is the power to deeply reshape company routines, current paradigms, 
and the global fit in the environment (Helfat et al., 2007). These new arrangements affect the whole 
company’s life, for example by unbalancing equilibria in the composition of stakeholders’ interests, by 
redefining contingent ways through which these publics can receive satisfaction, or by the emergence of 
completely new ethical challenges (Cornwall and Naughton, 2003). Undoubtedly, PR is the dominant virtue 
to face such situations, with its ability to find proper means and ‘right’ courses of actions (Buchholz and 
Rosenthal, 2005; Nonaka and Toyama, 2007; Hartman, 2008; Méle, 2009).  
Nevertheless, in order to activate entrepreneurial actions, a correct evaluation and perception of the situation 
by leaders is necessary (Kor et al., 2007; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). Thus we will study the judgment 
process and how individuals evaluate alternatives, in order to clearly define what should be the considered 
approach for successful entrepreneurs. We suggest the classification of PR into parts defined by Thomas 
Aquinas, considering specifically those related to judgment, also called potential parts, viz. synesis or 
common sense and gnome or perspicacity1 (NE, VI, 10, 1142aff; S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.51, a.3, a.4). Synesis 
informs judgment following shared, common, and accepted rules. Gnome is the mental habit which allows 
discernment about exceptional cases where normal rules are, to some extent, exceeded. Due to the 
uncertainty that is intrinsically related to entrepreneurial activities, a judgment based on a company’s past 
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experience, or on a collection of existing routines, may be insufficient to control and interpret all ethical 
questions and consequences. Thus a judgment based on common sense that correctly judges using ordinary 
norms and precepts may be ‘blind’ and lead to unexpected outcomes and possible inertial replies (Huff, 
1990; Christensen and Bower, 1996). Instead gnome correctly judging controversial cases, or those which 
escape ordinary rules, perfectly fits entrepreneurial ontology and nature. In our interpretation, such 
perspicacity enacts entrepreneurial orientation (Miller, 1983; Covin and Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996) and confers moral righteousness on the actions made on the basis of such orientation. 
In order to structure such claims, we offer an interpretative model of judgment based on the virtue of 
perspicacity or gnome by explicating its practical elements, i.e. knowledge-cognitive, external-affective, and 
personal-reflective dimensions. We also see that these dimensions resemble the effectuation model of action 
(Sarasvathy, 2001) based on three fundamental assumptions: What the entrepreneur knows, Who s/he is, and 
with Whom s/he collaborates. This perfectly places our model inside the body of entrepreneurial literature 
that can be used to frame the decision-making of leaders.  
This study makes different contributions to diverse streams of literature. First, our work studies a relatively 
new concept in the business ethics literature, i.e. the virtue of gnome. In other branches of applied ethics 
(such as medical ethics and bioethical studies), analyses of this virtue already exist, especially in relation to 
controversial issues such as euthanasia, appropriate medical treatments etc. (e.g., Murphy, 2006). In business 
too there are delicate matters in relation to radical changes and crises, such as firing employees, reshaping 
governance structures and processes, and so on, which would require the same perspicacity.  
Second, with reference to the entrepreneurial and managerial cognition literature, we add the virtue of 
perspicacity to the set of relevant characteristics involved in the cognitive process of judgment. Studies on 
this topic rarely present a strong account of ethical or philosophical implications (for a recent review, see 
Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). Indeed the virtue ethics has already put at a central stage the decision-making 
process specifically applied to business matters (e.g., Arjoon, 2008, 2010; Bastons, 2008; Grassl, 2010; 
Melé, 2010). Thus, we would like to stimulate a major debate between these two streams of literature. 
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Third, we offer a set of practical elements organized in an interpretative model of the process of ethical 
judgment. Thanks to a semantic reconstruction of the meanings of gnome, we show how a ‘correct’ 
entrepreneurial judgment should be made.  
Our study is articulated in five sections including this introduction. The second section is dedicated to the 
philosophical analysis of PR, particularly its separation into parts. Further, in the third section we explicate 
how perspicacity can contribute to the success of entrepreneurs because of the ability to correctly recognize 
exceptional business cases. The fourth section presents practical elements of the virtue of perspicacity and 
the interpretative model of ethical judgment. Also, we present one narrative case study from which some 
properties of our model may be inferred. The final section is dedicated to conclusions and limitations.        
Theoretical Elements of Practical Reason and its Parts 
The Importance of Practical Reason  
The highest sphere of the human soul, the intellectual part, encompasses one part of pure rationality 
(dianoia) and the character (ethos) is the other part. The former is related to the discovery of ultimate truths 
and universal concepts; the latter is led by reason but is also affected by, and needs to cope with, emotions 
and impulses coming from the sensitive part, viz. instincts and inclinations (NE, VI, 1, 1138b18ff; Aristotle, 
De Anima, III, 8, 431b20ff). In relation to this division, Aristotle proposes two sets of virtues: dianoetic 
virtues (techne or art, nous or intellect, episteme or science, sophia or wisdom, and PR) and ethical virtues 
such as justice, fortitude, and temperance, that represent the cardinal virtues (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.61, a.1-5). PR 
has always been considered to be one of the most unique virtues due to its natural duality. Fundamentally, 
PR has a dianoetic or intellectual nature while its context of application is strongly orientated towards 
practical matters as the domain of ethical virtues (NE, VI, 5, 1140a24ff and 7, 1141a9ff). Thus, PR is neither 
purely contemplative as the individuation of rational universal concepts, nor purely behavioural as derived 
from character (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.47, a.1, a.3-4).  
In an extreme synthesis, PR is the habit of finding the right means in relation to particular moral ends. PR 
applies universal rules and principles to real situations in order to obtain hoped for (good) outcomes (Melé, 
2010, pp.641–642). The other virtues set those particular ends (teloi), and PR renders it possible to find 
‘reasoned’ means and courses of action to achieve such ends (NE, VI, 13, 1144a8–11; S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.47, 
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a.6-7; MacIntyre, 1984). However, commanding rightful acts and thus perfecting actions, PR is not simply 
instrumental for other virtues. Indeed, PR actively contributes to perfect human purposes because ‘well 
done’ is not only about ‘what’ has been done but also arises from ‘how’ it is realized (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.47, 
a.1, a.4-5).  
Many scholars interpret PR as a link between ethical and dianoetic virtues (Cessario, 2002). PR confers 
awareness of the situation and of contingencies, orientating the ethical virtues towards the truth in order to 
act righteously. The awareness offered by PR is logically influenced by dianoetic virtues, which concern 
truth and universal concepts (NE, VI, 13, 1144b1ff; S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.9, a.1; q.58, a.5; Aquinas, Commentary 
on the Nicomachean Ethics, lectio 11, 1275). In turn, without PR, human beings would not be able to apply 
to reality the universal concepts and rules derived from dianoetic virtues. These two simultaneous conditions 
make PR oriented towards the good and inspired by truth. Probably for all of these reasons, PR is also 
considered a cardinal virtue and regarded as principal above the other virtues (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.61, a.3; 
Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, lectio 7, 1195 and lectio 11, 1275), and as the one most 
needed for human life (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.57, a.5).  
Integral and Subjective Parts of the Virtue of Practical Reason 
Beyond the general and recognized importance assigned to PR in business matters (Hartman, 2008; Dunham, 
2010), there is a good body of recent works that specifically uses the Thomistic framework (e.g. Arjoon, 
2008; Melé, 2009; Argandoña, 2011; Melé et al., 2011; Acevedo, 2012; Sison and Fontrodona, 2012). 
However, Aquinas’ framework is still underestimated, especially in studies of managerial or entrepreneurial 
cognition (for a review see Huff, 1990; Walsh, 1995; Kor et al., 2007), even if some studies have applied it 
to the decision-making process (Bastons, 2008; Arjoon, 2010; Grassl, 2010; Melé, 2010).  
In order to highlight the contributions that such interpretations can make to this debate, we need to deepen 
the philosophical analysis of PR. Aquinas recognizes that clustered around PR, as for the other cardinal 
virtues, a significant variety of other minor virtues is either integrated into or connected with the principal 
virtue (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.48, a.1; Bradley, 1997). This bundle of virtues, in Aquinas, is organized according to 
the medieval precepts of mereology, which is a branch of philosophy completely dedicated to the whole-
parts relation (Arlig, 2011). Aquinas’ categorization follows the ancient tradition started by Boethius in De 
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Divisione, who recognized that a whole can be formed or divided into parts, and that depends on its nature as 
an integral, universal, or potential whole2.  
Integral parts are essential components of a whole, for example a house is made of a roof, walls and doors. In 
turn, the integral whole would cease to exist as a whole without such components. Aquinas talks about 
integral parts of PR as being essential and characteristic activities or psychological dispositions in order to 
accomplish the proper act of the principal virtue (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.48 a.1; Bradley, 1997; Cessario, 2002). 
For these reasons, such integral parts of a virtue cannot be separated from it, inasmuch as an organ of a living 
being is not a living being in autonomy, nor can it operate without the whole. With respect to PR, integral 
parts individuate eight minor virtues: memory, understanding or intellect, docility, shrewdness, and 
reasoning regarded as cognitive components; foresight, circumspection, and caution regarded as normative 
(S.Th, IIa-IIae, q.48, a.1, q.49, a.1-8).  
Universal wholes are referred to as sets of genera and species (differentiae) in which such universal concepts 
can find expression, and these expressions are called subjective parts (S.Th, Ia, q.8, a.2). For example, 
individuals are subjective parts of the universal whole, a species, in this case, of human beings. The same can 
be said about all other genera of animals, e.g. horses, lions, etc., which constitute the universal whole 
‘animal’. A marked difference with regard to integral parts is the ‘cohesion’ of this subjective category. If 
subjective parts in reality ceased to exist, for example through the extinction of a species, the universal whole 
itself would not perish (Arlig, 2011). Also, an integral part represents only the part that it composes 
inasmuch as a hand is not a whole human being. The same sense cannot be grasped in relation to subjective 
parts because a lion is an animal as much as a human is. In discussing the subjective parts of PR, Aquinas 
states a primary division between a PR dedicated to self-governing and to governing of the multitudes. 
Regarding the latter kind of PR, other categories are highlighted: regnative PR when the multitudes represent 
cities or kingdoms from the perspective of the governor; political PR refers to the same multitudes but from 
the perspective of the subjects being governed; domestic PR is the application of such virtue to groups 
bonded for life, such as a family; and military PR is the virtue to governs a multitude bounded for a purpose, 
such as an army (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.48, a.1; q.50, a.1-4). 
Potential Parts of the Virtue of Practical Reason  
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Finally PR can be considered as a potential whole and so formed by potential parts. Boethius (De divisione, 
888a) talks about wholes being composed of ‘powers’ (potentiae), which are not separable, while at the same 
time a differentiation can be made based on the functions of the potential parts.  Potential parts are allied to 
the whole to express its full potency, and for this reason they are also called virtual parts as opposed to actual 
or integral parts (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, lectio 4-5, 262–298). As a master example 
of a potential whole, the human soul is often used. The soul is one and indivisible but at the same time is 
composed of parts, viz. vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual (Aristotle, De Anima, II, 3, 414a28ff). The 
vegetative part governs survival and procreation functions as exist in all living creatures: plants, animals and 
human beings; the sensitive part, which is shared by animals and human beings, directs impulses and 
sensible stimuli received from the external world; and the rational or intellectual part (dianoia and ethos) is 
the prerogative only of the human species if the immaterial or spiritual world is not considered (S.Th, Ia, 
q.78, a.1-4). As with subjective wholes, without some potential parts the whole still exists but a potential 
whole without one of its potential parts loses some of its power and cannot be considered as complete, 
similarly to what happens with integral wholes (S.Th. Ia, q.3, a.7; Arlig, 2011).  
About virtues Aquinas says that potential parts can occur even without the principal virtue, because they are 
virtues themselves, but they cannot reach the perfection of the whole as this is a specific quality of the 
principal virtue. Using his words:  
“The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, 
as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue […] the parts of prudence [i.e. practical reason] are: ‘good counsel’ which 
concerns counsel, ‘synesis’ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and ‘gnome’, which concerns judgment in 
matters of exception to the law” (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.48, a.1, respondeo).  
Specifically, good counsel or euboulia is dedicated to well-researched means of actions or well-advised 
investigation to find convenient and appropriate means for human purposes (S.Th, IIa-IIae, q.51, a.1-2). 
Common sense or synesis informs judgment following shared, common, and accepted rules in ordinary cases 
(S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.51, a.3); and perspicacity or gnome, which may be translated also as sharp-sightedness, 
sense of exceptionality, or maybe farsightedness is the mental habit which allows discernment about 
particular cases where normal rules are exceeded, i.e. in extraordinary or exceptional cases (S.Th, Ia-IIae, 
q.57, a.6 and IIae-IIae, q.51, a.4).  
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These cases are considered to be ‘extraordinary’ because of their complexity, where it is necessary to go 
beyond the simple surface of the order of reality and discover what truly lies beneath. Gnome makes possible 
the application of such superior principles as equity and epikeia which moderate and guide the use of norms 
in order to obtain fairer and better results. Gnome may be seen as a ‘trigger’ of equity and epikeia due to the 
fact that they can act only when the agent is aware of being in front of a special situation. Simple application 
of rules would lead to injustice rather than justice, to evil instead of good (Cajetan, Commentarius Summa 
Theologiae q.120; Rodríquez-Luño, 1997).  
Gnome is also the ability to identify positive or civil law’s domain of application (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.57, a.6 and 
IIae-IIae, q.51, a.4; Westberg, 1994-1995). Civil law cannot cover every eventuality of reality, so doubtful 
situations may arise, i.e. exceptional cases. An example is when the application of rules is not able to explain 
reality or clashes with the final scope of the law. In such situations, ‘wise’ judges avoid strict adherence to 
common, established, and shared rules that are contained in civil law, in order to make reference to major 
principles as equity contained in natural law. Thus, the correct judgment for such exceptional cases cannot be 
made using the virtue of synesis that judges well according to common and shared rules. Rather, this 
judgment should be assessed using the virtue of gnome that judges well where higher principles of soul and 
natural law must be applied (Cajetan, Commentarius Summa Theologiae q.51, q.120; Rodríquez-Luño, 1997; 
Cessario, 2002).  
The partition of PR into parts is shown in figure 1. 
_________________________ 
Figure 1 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
Concerning the relationship between PR and its potential parts, distinctions should be drawn according to 
acts and activities of competence (Bradley, 1997; Cessario, 2002). Aquinas states that three acts contribute to 
the perfect or complete action of PR: counsel, judgment, and command (consiliari et iudicare et praecipere 
or imperare) (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.57, a.6 and IIae-IIae, q.47, a.8, a.10, q.48, a.1). In the first step, the inquiry 
begins with the search for available means and alternatives. In a second moment, individuals evaluate the 
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appropriateness of such means for achieving a particular end, and in the final instance, command and precept 
are invoked to instruct an action (NE, VI, 11, 1143a8–11).  
If PR is the right reason applied to action, command is its principal act (principalis actus rationis practicae), 
while the other activities are assigned to its potential parts, respectively euboulia and synesis or gnome (S.Th, 
IIae-IIae, q.47, a.2, a.8 and q.51, a.1, a.3-4; Cajetan, Commentarius Summa Theologiae; q.47).  
Aquinas considers command as the principal act over the others because this is what makes men truly 
virtuous. A person can be extremely good at advising others, as with the possession of euboulia, but then 
fails to go beyond that point, displaying a lack of PR and command (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.57, a.6, IIae-IIae, q.48, 
a.1, q.51, a.1-4, q. 53, a.4). This can also be said of a person who can cleverly interpret and judge situations, 
i.e. one who correctly applies the virtue of synesis or gnome, but then performs careless actions or 
disorganized deeds, thereby also showing a lack of PR (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q. 53, a.3, a.5; Cessario, 2002). Thus, 
good advice and sound judgment must be conveyed into ‘reasoned’ deeds that are led by command and PR 
(Westberg, 1994). Despite this, Aquinas also highlights that perfect actions of PR cannot be so if the other 
potential parts are inadequately developed. He explains this condition by using the parallelism of potential 
parts of the human soul. The intellectual part of the soul (dianoia and ethos) could not exist and be perfect if 
the vegetative and sensitive parts did not exist or stopped guiding the more basic human functions (S.Th, Ia, 
q.78, a.1-4). To summarize, if on the one hand potential parts of PR are just qualities, limited in their intent, 
on the other hand, PR is perfect when its potential parts also intervene to instruct the action.  
Gnome and Synesis: Different Approaches to Judgment     
As mentioned before, acts of judgment correctly involve the use of gnome or synesis depending on the 
situation (S.Th, IIª-IIae, q.51, a.3-4). However, we need to clearly highlight when this step takes place inside 
the whole action process. To this end, we used Aquinas’ model of action according to Westberg’s 
interpretation (1994, p. 119ff). It considers every human action as articulated in four stages, each of which 
occurs as a results of the dynamic interaction of intellectual and volitional aspects (S.Th, Iª-IIae, q.9, a.1-6) 
(given in parentheses): intention (apprehensio and intentio) (S.Th, Iª-IIae, q.12, a.1-5), deliberation 
(consilium and consensus) (S.Th, Iª-IIae, q.14, a.1-6, q.15, a.1-4), decision (judicium and electio) (S.Th, Iª-
IIae, q.13, a.1-6), and execution (imperium and usus) (S.Th, Iª-IIae, q.16, a.1-4, q.17, a.1-9).  We will follow 
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Aquinas’ model in explaining the practical and entrepreneurial applications of perspicacity and common 
sense.     
The Decision Stage: the Step of Judgment and of Choice   
The decision stage or decision-making process in managerial terms is formed by two consequential steps: the 
judicium (the judgment) and the electio (the choice). In Aquinas, the first aspect is specifically understood as 
iudicio electionis (judgment of election) (S.Th, Iª-IIae, q.13, a.1), which in managerial terms we may see as 
the perception and evaluation of the alternatives available in order to solve a problem. The following step is 
the real choice of, and the final decision about, presumably the best solution (electio). However, this latter 
step is the inclination of will towards the specific object of judgment and, under specific conditions such a 
moment, already belongs to the command act (S.Th, Ia, q, 82, a.1-4, q.83, a.1-4 and Iª-IIae, q.13, a.1-2, q.16, 
a.1; Bradley, 1997). Indeed, all nuances of the command process should be ascribed to the principal act of 
PR (Cessario, 2002). 
Thus, inquiring only about the evaluation of the alternative or step of judgment and excluding the real choice 
or final decision is correct, at least in the light of two perspectives. Philosophically speaking, only the aspect 
of judgment can be directly and exclusively related to considerations concerning synesis and gnome. Instead, 
including the choice would necessarily involve facets related to the principal virtues of PR.  
Secondly, managerial literature specifically dedicated to the cognitive approach suggests that marked 
differences among leaders’ decision-making processes may be found during the evaluation of alternatives 
rather than in the final decision (Huff, 1990; Walsh, 1995; Kaplan, 2008). Some leaders are able to free 
themselves from their previous mental schemata, judging according to higher principles that waive the 
current paradigm. We will call such leaders ‘successful’ entrepreneurs because they can change their 
strategic action due to the acumen of their judgment. In contrast, other leaders have a strong cognitive 
resistance to change led by cognitive frames stuck in an old understanding of the environment. Such a 
condition bounds their judgment, reducing options about what can be done (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; 
Huff, 1990; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). We argue that both discerning and 
being aware of ‘exceptional’ cases, those that escape ‘normal’ rules, represent the first step in successfully 
replying to and anticipating conditions that change (Kirzner, 1973).  
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The Emergence of Entrepreneurial Orientation  
In turbulent contexts, contingencies of business suddenly and frequently change, and such stimulations 
require a company’s leaders to pay attention to weak signals, as to give concrete replies (Teece et al., 1997). 
Changeable and uncertain circumstances, at certain points, may make companies’ current routines, traditions 
or approaches unsuitable. In particular, the strategic management literature addresses this topic with the 
introduction of the concept of dynamic capabilities, which are learning processes that allow the 
reconfiguration of resources, knowledge and competences (Teece et al., 1997).  
A substantially flexible approach to the environment may be also required in order to grasp or create new 
opportunities in the market and to structure new paths of growth. Consequently, the entrepreneurship 
literature talks about entrepreneurial orientation as entrepreneurial processes, methods, practices, and 
decision-making styles used by leaders to act entrepreneurially (Miller, 1983; Covin and Slevin, 1991; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, p. 136)3. Despite the fact that dynamic capabilities and entrepreneurial orientation 
refer to the companies and their behaviour, the initial kick-start for such processes should be made in 
leaders’ minds (Huff, 1990; Walsh, 1995). Leaders try to match their mental images of the environment and 
perceptions of opportunities with the action of the company, thus ultimately, dynamic capabilities and 
entrepreneurial orientation are enacted by leaders’ perceptions and evaluation of alternatives (Penrose, 1959; 
Kor et al., 2007; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). This connection validates the possibility of studying the personal 
dispositions of leaders, in relation to companies’ outcomes and performance. 
A central topic of the managerial and entrepreneurial cognitive body of studies is to understand and discover 
constrains to change. Knight (1921) explains that environmental changes and uncertainty are not crucial 
points per se; rather, leaders are unable to assess what those contingencies really mean and which might be 
consequential (Walsh, 1995; Kaplan, 2008). In this work, particular attention is paid to misleading individual 
behaviours – those that drive the misleading strategic actions of the company – that are related to leaders’ 
judgment processes (Starbuck et al., 1978; Thaler, 2000). Leaders’ perceptions about opportunities and the 
environment affect their judgment, e.g. feasible alternatives are weighted in different ways in relation to 
perceived constraints (Gifford, 1992; Dew et al., 2009). Thus, leaders can fail to judge correctly due to their 
cognitive biases about contingencies (Huff, 1990). Judgment results are wrong and ill-directed because of the 
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particular circumstances – that need different approaches – rather than the absolute unreasonableness of the 
applied criteria of judgment (Kaplan, 2008). For example, procrastination on applying ordinary routines and 
past successful strategies during moments of radical changes in the market fails to redirect the strategic 
action of a company (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; Christensen and Bower, 1996). As Nonaka and 
Toyama (2007, p. 379) suggest, successful leaders firstly ‘see’ and ‘feel’ problems, then are properly able to 
act.  
So, the judgment, either with the use of common sense or perspicacity, ends by offering an ‘image’ or 
scenario for each alternative, basically positive or negative. When in business life a ‘normal’ or ordinary case 
is recognized, the judgment may be properly based on present paradigms and routines, as a judgment 
assessed on the basis of common sense. In contrast, the existing situation may be considered as an 
‘extraordinary case’, and so the disapplication of actual paradigms and the activation of actions made with an 
entrepreneurial orientation may be positively evaluated, as a judgment assessed on the basis of perspicacity. 
Hence, in conclusion, before acting in a revolutionary way, leaders need to understand that dynamic 
capabilities or entrepreneurial orientation are the best solutions to face those contingent circumstances. 
The Ability of Perspicacity and Common Sense to Frame Radical Changes 
In order to explain in business terms how judgment based on gnome or synesis may work, we use some 
examples drawn from the literature. Christensen and Bower’s study (1996) shows the failure of established 
disk drive producers during the expansion phase of the PC during the1980s. The reason for the collapse was 
a limited innovation trajectory, completely structured on clients’ base claims, i.e. large computer factories of 
that time. At the beginning of the digital era, the market for computers was mainly dominated by 
mainframes, while small computers to be used at home (PCs) were regarded as nothing more than toys with a 
limited market (Christensen and Bower, 1996). Consequently, under pressure from computer companies, the 
R&D activities of disk drive producers tended to continuously increase the storage space of their devices. 
However, such a focus rendered leaders of established companies in the disk drive industry unable to ‘see’ 
the emergence of the new market of the floppy disk associated with the use of PCs. 
Another example is the one offered by D’Aveni and MacMillan (1990) on crisis management and attention 
from CEOs during this same period. Their results revealed that in companies which survived a crisis, their 
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leaders were more external oriented in order to grasp every possible signal from external environments. In 
contrast, in failed companies, leaders concentrated their attention on internal information.  
It can be seen that similarities exist between the two cases. First, both situations deal with uncertainty; on the 
one hand the opening of the new market of floppy disks, and on the other hand a crisis phase of established 
companies. Second, without a doubt we can assert that the companies’ reactions and those of their leaders 
were reasonable in a general sense but unfounded in the particular situation. Abstracting from these 
circumstances, listening to clients’ claims, as in the first example, and taking into consideration internal 
information, as in the second one, can be considered good managerial practices, i.e. general rules that should 
be followed. Nevertheless, in such cases, these conducts reveal themselves to be absolutely misleading for 
the companies’ behaviours leading to failure. Rather, successful leaders adopted almost counterfactually 
strategies with a disapplication of ordinary paradigms and their common way of ‘feeling’. In the examples, 
leaders decided to go against past experience and routines, for example disregarding the reasonable 
expectations of their stakeholders. However, by following this path, successful leaders have saved the whole 
firm system, thus assuring new forms of stakeholders’ satisfaction.  
We can see a parallel between the cases chosen from the literature and what we presented in the 
philosophical part. Gnome is the ability to switch from a judgment based on the present paradigms and rules 
to higher principles. In our cases listening to clients and taking into consideration information coming from 
the internal environment were the basic principles, while saving the whole company system was at a higher 
level. Evaluating as positive the disapplication of current paradigms, perspicacity allows appropriate 
companies’ replies i.e., actions made with an entrepreneurial orientation. Thus, judgment based on gnome 
has a deeper level of consciousness and wisdom by grasping all possibly ethical implications. Instead, 
judgment based on synesis misses the sense of exceptionality that allows for a reconfiguration of paradigms4. 
Indeed synesis leads the judgment with the maxima ‘what happens in most cases’ (id quod plerumque 
accidit), while radical changes or exceptional cases are fewer in number and constitute a ‘rare’ material that 
escapes the normality (Cajetan, Commentarius Summa Theologiae, q.51, q. 120). Thus, the application of 
common sense, in situations of radical change, seems to lead to less dynamic replies or even to inertia (Huff, 
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1990; March, 1991; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). Our discussion is summarized 
in figure 2. 
_________________________ 
Figure 2 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
 
Entrepreneurial Perspicacity or Gnome 
The Application of the Virtue of Perspicacity to Entrepreneurial Contexts 
In the light of the previous considerations, we define ‘successful entrepreneurs’ to be those leaders who are 
able to correctly understand when routines and paradigms need to be changed, or partially disregarded, and 
recognize this as a major benefit for the survival of the company and its continuing prosperity. However, 
such survival and prosperity can only be achieved if the company acts instrumentally to create ‘welfare’ and 
contributes towards the common good for society and a large number of stakeholders. 
We will regard these individuals as successful entrepreneurs to highlight the difference between them and 
the general term leaders. This concept of ‘success’ is holistic because we assumed that the judgment made 
on the basis of perspicacity is a ‘trigger’ of correct entrepreneurial orientation, which in turn is related to 
economic performance. As a matter of fact, many studies have already pointed out how entrepreneurial 
orientation can lead to higher firm performance (e.g. Miller, 1983; Covin and Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009; Covin and Lumpkin, 2011). 
In particular, the successful entrepreneur is a virtuous person who better interprets and judges situations in a 
novel way (Novak, 1993). Even assuming that leaders have the same levels of moral standards, or of even 
other characteristics, successful entrepreneurs will produce higher value compared with their peers who have 
not developed this habit (Sternberg, 1990). Thus, successful entrepreneurs show a PR more directed during 
the judgment by perspicacity, that allows an approach to reality more fitting to the circumstances5. 
This consideration is even more true if we consider that successful entrepreneurs have understood that their 
success is as such only if they can deliver social and common good through their company, otherwise any 
kind of success would be only ephemeral (Goodpaster, 2011; Melé et al., 2011).  
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Thus, this concept of ‘success’ recomposes the ethical dimension of acting from an economic perspective, 
because the ultimate goal of the company – the contribution towards common good – is the mandatory 
objective of both (Cornwall and Naughton, 2003). In considering the equally important roles of ethics and 
economics in relation to the welfare of the company, its stakeholders and society, we assume a position 
similar to that expressed by the Encyclical letter Caritas in Veritate6 (Benedict XVI, 2009).  
Before moving on to explain the model of judgment on the basis of perspicacity, we need to make some 
minor clarifications to the application of such virtue in an entrepreneurial context. First, gnome seems hard to 
practise because ‘exceptional cases’ occur on rare occasions. Similarly to other minor virtues connected with 
the cardinal virtues of fortitude, such as magnanimity and as magnificence, they can be practised only in 
extreme and excessive circumstances, but nevertheless they are important to guide human actions (S.Th, IIae-
IIae, q.129, a.1-2, 134, a.1-3). However, considering the business life of the last few decades, radical changes 
in the market have always occurred at an increasing rate. Thus, in this historical moment, perspicacity is not 
relegated to hypothetical situations but it represents, although not sufficiently, a necessary virtue for 
entrepreneurship.  
Second, as with any other virtue, gnome is not an inclination given by nature but it must be practised. This 
means that simply being exposed to entrepreneurial activities is not enough for developing perspicacity. 
Becoming an expert in such a ‘skill’ requires considerable effort, so only some individuals will take this step, 
despite their experience and tenure as leaders (Starbuck et al., 1978; Krueger, 2007). Leaders must be 
engaged in the process until such behaviours become habitual for their character. Thus, from this perspective 
we may see virtues, in our case, perspicacity, as ‘deliberate practices’ towards the right medium (Ericsson 
and Charness, 1994). In philosophical terms, gnome can be virtually acquired studying past ‘exceptional 
cases’ and from an effort to continuously improve discernment of reality and probably the same can be said 
in an entrepreneurial context (Cajetan, Commentarius Summa Theologiae, q.51).  
A third aspect to clarify is the relation between gnome and PR regarding entrepreneurial behaviours. We are 
not arguing that autonomously perspicacity renders leaders’ actions rightful. We showed in the philosophical 
part that gnome, and synesis, are only ‘virtually’ practical (S.Th, Iª-IIae, q.13, a.1-2); PR is needed to 
complete the action. Entrepreneurial orientation and related practical actions have greater implications and 
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complications than the simple process of judgment (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Covin and Lumpkin, 2011). 
Due to this complexity, PR is the only virtue able to find the proper means and the right course of action for 
this matter (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005; Nonaka and Toyama, 2007; Hartman, 2008; Méle, 2009). Gnome 
being only a (potential) part of PR cannot be a panacea for entrepreneurship; thus to be confident of success 
in every aspect of business life, it is not just about recognizing when to ‘break the rules’ and acting 
consequentially. Nevertheless, our contribution highlights that perfect PR is instructed by a reasoned 
judgment (S.Th, IIª-IIae, q.48, a.1-4) that in uncertain contingencies must be exerted with perspicacity.  
Finally, gnome and synesis do not exclude each other; rather they exist in the same person forming a 
complete moral judgment. In personal or business life, ordinary and exceptional cases will always exist and 
consequently gnome and synesis must simultaneously exist too. We do not want to channel the erroneous 
idea that judgment based on synesis is generally a ‘wrong’ way to judge situations. We simply suggest that 
under extremely uncertain conditions, this judgment is incomplete and not deep enough to grasp all possible 
ethical implications. Thus from an entrepreneurial point of view, it seems that in the composition of PR as a 
potential whole, perspicacity needs to play a prominent role to achieve a lasting prosperity of the firm. On 
the other hand, judgment based on perspicacity may be inappropriate when ordinary situations are faced. If 
disapplication of rules and paradigms is not necessary, perspicacity could even be harmful. However, against 
this possible interpretation, Aquinas himself asserts that being able to judge extraordinary cases is a sign of 
profound wisdom and this condition renders it easier to assess every eventuality (S.Th, IIª-IIae, q. 51, a.4). In 
relation to this consideration, it seems relevant to assert that gnome self-discerns the correct border of its 
domain thanks to a deeper understanding of what lies beneath the surface of every situation (Cessario, 2002). 
Semantic Reconstruction of the Concept of Gnome   
For the sake of parsimony, hereafter we refer to ‘entrepreneurial gnome or perspicacity’ as the ability to 
detect correctly exceptional cases and in turn to correctly enact the entrepreneurial orientation process. 
Theoretically speaking, we have already explained why entrepreneurial perspicacity can express the 
expertise of successful entrepreneurs. Here, we want to identify some practical elements of this virtue and 
how this judgment can work. Practical implications can be deduced from an accurate semantic analysis of the 
definition of gnome.  
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Despite the fact that for this work we only employed the interpretation of Aquinas of the virtue of gnome, in 
the semantic analysis for several reasons we preferred to make reference to Aristotle’s original text, rather 
than to Aquinas’ treatise. First of all, working on the Aristotelian concept renders our analysis similar to the 
interpretation that Aquinas may have used to elaborate his own concept. Aquinas probably had a wide range 
of possibilities to interpret the word gnome, but all were derived from the Biblical Greek because Latin did 
not have a really ‘direct’ translation. This situation may also be inferred by reading the original text of 
Aquinas; for the potential parts of PR he used transliterations, while for other concepts well-established in 
the Latin language tradition, translations are employed, e.g. for some of the integral parts of PR. Second, 
Aristotle’s work was the main reference of the Aquinas interpretation, especially regarding the virtue of PR 
(Westberg, 1994). Finally from a practical perspective, by working on the original Biblical Greek text, we 
avoided large losses of semantic contents in the multiple translation process, i.e. from Greek to Latin, from 
Latin to modern European languages, and for those different from English, a further round of translation.  
Commentators and translators of Biblical Greek manuscripts have agreed that gnome has a complex 
meaning, also in relation to its derivations. For example, Rackham (trans., Aristotle, ed.1968) clearly 
assesses that meanings of this set of words ranges from ‘judgment’, ‘good judgment’, ‘well-judging’ in sense 
of considerate and kindly, or to ‘judgment with’. Furthermore, in some languages, i.e. modern Italian and 
Spanish, gnome has assumed new and different interpretations from the original concept. Gnome in such 
languages means an experiential dictum, while the word is probably related to the capacity of producing 
these kinds of dicta as suggested by Natali (trans. Aristotle, ed.1999). The unclear translation of gnome may 
hinder its pragmatic use; thus, we have assessed a semantic analysis of the passage that explicates gnome in 
Aristotle’s treatise (NE, VI, 11, 1143a19–24). Table 1 is a comparison of gnome and its derivatives 
(syngnomonas, echein […] gnomen, syngnomonikon, and sygnome(n)) in 20 contributions either in the 
English, French, German, Italian, or Spanish language. Thanks to this deep semantic analysis performed with 
the strong support of expert translators7, we have reconstructed some meaningful classes of elements, that we 
have called dimensions, in order to form our interpretative model of the step of judgment.  
_________________________ 
Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
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__________________________ 
 
The Three Dimensions of Perspicacity: Knowledge-cognitive, External-affective, and Personal-reflective 
In table 2 we reported three classes of meanings that emerged from the semantic analysis. Each of them 
represents one dimension of our model, which explains the process of a judgment made on the basis of 
entrepreneurial perspicacity8. 
_________________________ 
Table 2 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
 
First of all, perspicacity, similarly to PR, is intimately tied to an aspect related to knowledge, with 
expressions such as discernment, distinction, judgment, and reason mainly assigned to the Greek word 
gnome (γνωμη). The virtue of gnome in this facet displays a deeper understanding, a conscious discernment 
of what the contingencies of life are. Indeed, a very sensible, discriminating judgment is needed to 
distinguish what should be treated in ordinary and common ways from what necessitates a more accurate 
comprehension. Despite similarities with PR, here the final scope of such knowledge is not action but the 
evaluation of alternatives, perfecting only the modus operandi of judgment. Thus, this dimension effectively 
signals the relevant elements that should be taken into consideration during moral reasoning (Hartman, 
2008). Peculiar characteristics to this dimension are: its nature that seems to be more related to the purely 
rational part of the soul (dianoia); its contents that are related to categories of possibility and impossibility 
(aletheia, truth); and its focus that is oriented towards initial hints elaborated from the alternatives. In a 
managerial fashion, we can say that this aspect approaches reality interpreting weak signals so that 
successful entrepreneurs become aware of the ‘prodromes or initial symptoms’ of change (Kirzner, 1973; 
Kor et al., 2007). We considered this dimension to be a knowledge-cognitive dimension.  
The second aspect is related to the word sygnome, either nominative or accusative cases 
(συγγνωμη/συγγνωμην). Different translations depict this concept as: compassion, consideration for others, 
forgiveness, indulgence, mercy, and sympathy. The virtue of gnome in this dimension demonstrates a ‘caring’ 
aspect regarding other people, a connection to an external dimension of judgment (Alberti, 2008). This 
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distinction reveals perhaps the most marked difference between judgment made using perspicacity or 
common sense, because the latter has less power to trigger equity and epikeia that fundamentally are 
dispositions towards others (Rodríquez-Luño, 1997).   
This dimension has almost complementary peculiarities to the previous one: its nature seems to be more 
related to the affective part of the soul (ethos), its contents are more ethical in nature, and its focus is oriented 
towards outcomes especially the ‘gut’ feeling that the outcomes of each alternative invoke in the agent who 
needs to judge. In a managerial fashion, this dimension lets entrepreneurs ‘feel’ the problem and not simply 
be aware of its connotations (Nonaka and Toyama, 2007). Thus, the process of evaluating alternatives is 
enlarged and takes into consideration together the prompts and sensations about outcomes. For all these 
reasons, this aspect is a component of the moral sensitivity (Haidt, 2001; Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005) and 
we call it the external-affective dimension of the virtue of perspicacity.   
The third bundle of terminologies inquires about a personal dimension of this accurate judgment based on 
the virtue of gnome, and it is related to many terms such as syngnomonas (συγγνωμονας), echein […] 
gnomen (εχειν […] γνωμην), syngnomonikon (συγγνωμονικoν), and sygnomen (συγγνωμην). Despite the fact 
that all of these meanings refer to a habit possessed by individuals, this dimension is not homogeneous like 
the others, but markedly different orientations can be seen. 
One orientation is devoted to the self of who judges, in our case the entrepreneurs, how to handle deeper 
levels of knowledge about the judgment i.e. input coming from the knowledge-cognitive dimension. This 
personal ability to judge, mainly contained in the first two words, is regarded as: be(ing) considerate, (being) 
discrete, have(ing) discretion, have(ing) right judgment, (being) judicious, reasonable men and wise. The 
other orientation, however, is devoted to instructing the self of the subject who is evaluating, in relation to 
the ability to ‘sense’ other people’s expectations, desires and feelings. This orientation regulates the ways in 
which the evaluating subject becomes connected to others and pushes towards developing a sense of caring 
for the external environment. The other terms of this dimension received translations such as: be(ing) 
sympathetic judges, benign, disposed to exercise kind consideration, have(ing) forgiveness, be(ing) able to 
show proof of kindness, (being) well-intentioned.  
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These two orientations neither state the level of knowledge of the judgment that is considered in the first 
dimension, nor the disposition towards the other that is considered in the second dimension of our 
composition of the virtue of perspicacity. Instead, the two orientations of the last dimension recompose the 
whole judgment process into a personal and perspicacious vision of the reality as it is. The personal 
dimension seems to emulate the ‘hybrid’ nature of the principal virtues of PR, balancing the more rational 
part of judgment (knowledge-cognitive dimension) with the more sensitive part (external-affective 
dimension), as much as PR does in relation to the dianoetic and ethical virtues. Thus, this dimension perfects 
the action of judging alternatives to channel clues and signals coming from a blurred reality, a ‘gut’ feeling 
about the outcomes of each of the available alternative, and the personal reinterpretations of both. Hence, the 
personal dimension seems to be the embodiment of moral imagination (Carroll, 1980; Buchholz and 
Rosenthal, 2005). We could also call this component the personal-reflective dimension.  
All these dimensions may potentially be regarded, following the medieval precepts of mereology, as the 
integral parts of gnome. Thus, without all of them there is no judgment based on gnome (Boethius, De 
Divisione, 880a).  
Our interpretative model states that the judgment of alternatives (iudicio electionis) begins with moral 
reasoning. The knowledge-cognitive dimension scans initial symptoms, weak signals, and hints coming from 
the circumstances in order to establish an ‘alarm system’ in the minds of the entrepreneurs, especially if 
deviations from ‘normality’ are detected. Indeed, this is a moment of moral reasoning.  Then, successful 
entrepreneurs become ‘sensible’ to the problem, with the intervention of the external-affective dimension. 
This moment of moral sensitivity comprises feelings that entrepreneurs mature regarding possible 
alternative’s outcomes, especially in relation to stakeholders’ welfare and the production of a common good. 
At this step, the initial judgment, mainly rationality based, is enriched by feelings of appreciation or 
uneasiness in relation to potential outcomes of each alternative. In doing that, entrepreneurial judgment 
becomes ‘responsible’ and ‘human’, a fundamental trait required of a fair and successful entrepreneur9 
(Cornwall and Naughton, 2003). Finally, in a very personal way, entrepreneurs elaborate interpretations 
about conjectures and feelings acquired during previous steps. This ability concludes the process of judgment 
and imagines multiple and flexible scenarios for the set of alternatives, a fundamental process of what 
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Carroll terms moral imagination (1980, p. 9). With these final scenarios given by the personal-reflective 
dimension of perspicacity, successful entrepreneurs will be able to understand correctly any uncertainty of 
the circumstances, and if the case requires it, will disregard current paradigms of action and engage in 
processes of entrepreneurial orientation. Figure 3 visualizes the formation of a judgment based on 
entrepreneurial perspicacity. 
_________________________ 
Figure 3 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________ 
 
However, again we highlight that perspicacity only confers the perfect ‘frame’, the light under which 
alternatives should be judged whereas the whole entrepreneurial action, i.e. actions done with entrepreneurial 
orientation, are the domain of PR. 
Entrepreneurship Studies and Entrepreneurial Perspicacity 
We want to ground our analysis of entrepreneurial perspicacity in the entrepreneurship literature in order to 
validate our model. To do this, we have taken into account works of entrepreneurial ethics that have the 
process of judgment as their central issue. 
Buchholz and Rosenthal (2005, p. 308-309) regard flexibility in moral judgment – which is not moral 
relativity – as extremely crucial for entrepreneurship. Strict adherence to ‘pre-established’ rules, considered 
as judgment based on common sense in our analysis, betrays a lack of sensitivity and even encourages 
immoral behaviours. They also assert that key features of such flexibility are moral imagination and 
sensitivity. Clarke and Holt (2010, p. 320) talk about the entrepreneurial dilemma as being a balance between 
external pressures and personal judgment. The authors claim that successful entrepreneurs can sustain their 
judgment and action even when they diverge from the common perception. These two works arrive at similar 
conclusions, even though actually they do not share the same ontology: the adherence to an external common 
way of feeling and to pre-established rules, i.e. the application of common sense, can be harmful if applied 
and followed without deeper discernment of uncertain contingencies (Dunham, 2010).  
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Considering specifically our conceptual model and its elements as knowledge-cognitive, affective-external, 
and personal-reflective dimensions, we found a strong similarity to the effectual approach (Sarasvathy, 2001; 
Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005). For entrepreneurial studies effectual logic is a relatively new paradigm, which 
definitely opposes the basic assumptions of the so-called causal logic, i.e. traditional thoughts derived from 
economic theories. The main assumptions of effectual logic are compared to those of causal logic, given in 
parentheses here, in order to highlight the opposed ontologies: 1) creative vision about the future (versus 
predictive and controlling vision); 2) taking action considering the means of disposition (versus purely goal-
orientation); 3) risk and resources are evaluated in terms of affordable loss (versus focus on expected 
returns); 4) attitude towards stakeholders and orientation to partnership (versus competitive attitude); and 5) 
unexpected circumstances considered as opportunities to be leveraged (versus consideration as threats to be 
avoided)10. In particular, Sarasvathy and Dew (2005) argue that the entrepreneurial process begins with three 
resources: the identity of the entrepreneur, the amount and the kind of knowledge possessed, and the network 
of agents with whom one can collaborate.  
In a successive study the same authors reinterpret these three resources in terms of ethical challenges to be 
answered: What the entrepreneur knows, Who s/he is, and with Whom s/he collaborates (Dew and 
Sarasvathy, 2007). Undoubtedly these questions resemble our dimensions, although the effectuation model 
globally embraces entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial process as a whole, going beyond the simple step 
of judgment.  
The knowledge-cognitive dimension poses relevant issues for a deeper understanding of the abstract 
knowledge of entrepreneurs. In other words, this dimension supports individuals in managing their 
knowledge endowment, e.g. by indicating which part of such patrimony proves to be more relevant to the 
particular contingencies of the moment or suggesting actions to acquire missing elements. The external-
affective dimension takes care of the entrepreneur’s relations and manages these interactions to understand 
others’ feelings and expectations. Finally, the personal-reflective dimension channels the other 
considerations into a personal judgment ‘appropriate’ for the identity of the entrepreneur. This phase brings 
to light visionary and creative scenarios for future outcomes (Kraut, 1991). Yet in line with what we have 
said before, it has been found that expert entrepreneurs, here considered as successful, employ distinctive 
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effectuation logic, i.e. our three dimensional model, to frame entrepreneurial problems more than any other 
approach (Dew et al., 2009). 
Narrative Case Study of a Successful Entrepreneur  
To conclude our work, we present the narratives about Geox Spa and its founder Mario Moretti-Polegato that 
may represent a case of employment of entrepreneurial perspicacity. Geox’s success is publicly 
acknowledged11 and self-evident just by considering the results that in less than 20 years the company 
developed from a start-up to a world leader in the shoes and fashion industry. Data collection came from a 
mix of sources such as financial reports, documental archives, interviews, newspapers, the company’s 
website, and academic case studies about the company and its environment (Ciappei and Simoni, 2005; 
Sammarra and Belussi, 2006; Camuffo et al., 2008).  
We acknowledge that this is a limitation of our paper because considerations are just inferred through a 
reconstruction of the story’s evidences. Hence, we cannot assure that such judgments are univocally and 
directly related to the use of perspicacity. Nevertheless, the interpretation we made may be useful for further 
studies to employ our theory about entrepreneurial perspicacity and its dimensions.  
With regard to Geox’s history, we have paid special attention only to the start-up moment where uncertainty 
was extremely high and consequently perspicacity may have played a central role. The founder of Geox, 
Mario Moretti-Polegato, comes from a third-generation entrepreneurial family. After attaining a degree in 
Agricultural Science, he started his career as an entrepreneur in the family business that was mainly focused 
on the winegrower and wine-making industry. During that early period he developed his entrepreneurial 
passion for business and for the ‘enjoyment’ of creating something productive.  
During a trip to Reno (Nevada), he decided to go hiking after a wine convention. The high temperature and 
arduous effort soon made walking unbearable.  His rubber-soled shoes, despite being suitably designed for 
hiking, overheated his feet and made them sweat excessively. Therefore, in search of relief, he used a pocket-
knife and cut holes into the soles of his sneakers (Geox Press Map, 2012).  
Since that experience, he became interested in this problem, especially after having worked out that no 
footwear producers had ever found a solution. The technical issue was how to combine at the same time in a 
sole the necessity for freshness, while keeping the feet dry preventing groundwater from coming in. Moretti-
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Polegato then spent three years studying and experimenting, and finally came up with a patent for the first 
model of Geox’s shoes. The technology resolved the problem of rubber soles by using an integrated system 
of a perforated sole with a thin internal membrane, promoted as ‘the shoes that breathe’12. However, the first 
search for a partner to develop an industrial production of the model was unsuccessful as all the major 
footwear manufacturers such as Nike, Adidas, Timberland, etc., turned down his proposal (Camuffo et al., 
2008). Nonetheless, instead of abandoning the programme, Moretti-Polegato decided to carry on and start 
production in a small leather laboratory belonging to his family in the district of Montebelluna.  
Another crucial element at the beginning of the activity was how to commit employees to such an uncertain 
project. Moretti-Polegato engaged five young employees, workers from the district, to supervise the strategic 
functions of the embryonic company. He promised great returns within a short time if they were prepared to 
take care of the venture. Moretti-Polegato, by avoiding an autocratic leadership style and paying particular 
attention to the empowerment process, developed in them a strong sense of affiliation and identification, 
which in turn assured a winning initial team for the company (Ciappei and Simoni, 2005). 
At the moment of the commercial launch, Moretti-Polegato developed a smart entry strategy in order to 
approach an already saturated market: the shoe industry. The first model of these shoes was made for 
children and distributed free of charge to schools and other children’s institutions. With this bottom-up 
process, the children’s segment facilitated the consecutive entrance of Geox shoes to the mainstream market, 
where adults, parents, or relatives of those children were already familiar with the brand and the product. The 
marketing communication strategy during the launch was based on the technical characteristics of the 
product rather than simply appealing to the ‘Italian style’ (Camuffo et al., 2008). This strategy, quite 
untypical for Italian fashion companies, was adopted because Moretti-Polegato was convinced that his 
product would attract customers with ‘real needs’, more than those only interested in extremely trendy 
designs.  
Considering this small narrative about the entrepreneur and the company, we have given evidence of salient 
aspects, interpreted in the light of our framework. At the beginning of his entrepreneurial journey, Moretti-
Polegato probably had experienced contrasting feelings and signals coming from the circumstances.  
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His experience in the US signalled a ‘real’ need for users of rubber-soled shoes; however, producers were 
not showing any interest in that need or, even worse, they did not see the problem at all. His knowledge-
cognitive dimension probably began to ponder this opening set of alternatives and to reveal elements of 
dystonia in respect to his knowledge. Even if an entrepreneur coming from the wine-making industry could 
not directly apply his factual knowledge to the situation, his higher principles of entrepreneurial judgment 
may have awakened a sense of alertness for new opportunities.  
After that, the external-affective dimension probably came into play. We can infer this from his engagement 
with his employees. Of course, as we have repeated during this study, behaviour is not the domain of 
judgment or of gnome. However, good behaviour, correctly ordered by PR in execution, is also the result of 
an initial ‘good’ judgment (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.48, a.1, q.51, a.1-4).   
Finally, especially in the launch phase, we can conceive that a great role was played by the personal-
reflective dimension of perspicacity, which had judged as positive a partial disapplication of current 
paradigms. Both the entry and communication strategies prima facie may appear as counterfactual. First, 
despite a strong investment in technologies and innovation made by Geox during the start-up phase, the 
entrepreneur decided to enter into a less competitive, but also initially less remunerative, segment. With 
common sense, a leader would have avoided such a counterfactual course of action or, in other words, would 
have regarded such an alternative in a negative light. The circumstances indeed presented extremely 
uncertain revenue levels against a huge investment. However, this decision turned out to be wise; on the one 
hand it let final customers of Geox become familiar with the product through their children’s experience; at 
the same time, dangerous business reactions from the incumbents of the industry were avoided thanks to a 
non-direct and not compelling foray into the main market. Secondly, the communication strategy deliberately 
avoided emphasis on a potential ‘strength’ of the company, i.e. the Italian style. This would probably have 
appealed to some segments of customers over the short term, but on the other hand it would have confused 
customers belonging to Geox’s real target, i.e. people with a real need for ‘smart comfort’.  
Conclusion 
This study aims to enrich the scholarly discourse of business ethics on the interpretation of PR in 
entrepreneurial activities. We have introduced new elements of reflection thanks to Aquinas’ interpretation 
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of PR and its potential parts, in particular gnome and synesis. These two secondary virtues share the same 
domain viz. the judgment but only the former, assuming exceptionality of the contingencies, can obtain fairer 
outcomes. The latter instead consists of judgments more oriented towards experience and is based on already 
consolidated rules and norms. Unfortunately, radical changes and uncertainty bring revolutions of paradigms 
and this may render consolidated routines useless.  
Then, as a result of the semantic reconstruction of the meaning of gnome, we highlighted how a ‘correct’ 
entrepreneurial judgment should be performed. Specifically, we emphasised the three dimensions of our 
model, i.e., knowledge-cognitive, external-affective, and personal-reflective. The knowledge-cognitive 
dimension offers insights and hints about becoming aware of being confronted by an exceptional case. The 
external-affective dimension then stimulates sensations about potential outcomes proposed by the 
alternatives. Finally, the personal-reflective dimension allows entrepreneurs to develop multiple and flexible 
scenarios to counter prevailing paradigms. Judgments made using perspicacity as the ‘trigger’ of correct 
entrepreneurial orientation in turn lead to higher performance (Rauch et al., 2009; Covin and Lumpkin, 
2011). A major reliance on entrepreneurial perspicacity in the composition of PR thus permits entrepreneurs 
advantageously to create value for the firm and for society while at the same time being themselves enriched 
and experiencing their lives flourishing (Cornwall and Naughton, 2003; George, 2003; Benedict XVI, 2009; 
Goodpaster, 2011). In this way, entrepreneurial work is ‘good’ not only in relation to positive outcomes but 
for the entrepreneurs themselves who become ‘perfected’ through their activities (MacIntyre, 1984). 
This work makes different contributions to knowledge which are all related to the virtue of gnome. First we 
have applied this concept to business ethics, where, to the best of our knowledge, it was still missing. This 
concept, even though beyond the particular focus of our studies, can be used to address delicate situations of 
business and controversial ethical issues. We have also validated the idea that virtues are involved in the 
cognitive decision-making process (Arjoon, 2008, 2010; Melé, 2010). We individuate three practical 
elements to interpret how the judgment based on perspicacity may work. Also our interpretation can be used 
in combination with, and enlarged by, previous models which specifically involve virtues in their 
consideration (e.g. Bastons, 2008; Grassl, 2010). 
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Obviously our paper has limitations, as our theses are untested in an empirical setting. The presentation of a 
narrative case study is not sufficient to support our claims with strong evidence. Further research is needed to 
address this gap, for example in an experimental setting, by presenting hypothetical situations to 
entrepreneurs. In this way, judgment based on perspicacity or common sense could emerge critically 
analysing the replies of the involved subjects.  
 
                                                             
1 From now on we will use the word ‘perspicacity’ interchangeably with ‘gnome’ and the word ‘common sense’ 
interchangeably with ‘synesis’. In particular, the Biblical Greek transliterations have been mainly maintained from a 
philosophical perspective, while in contexts of a more entrepreneurial nature we have tended to use the translated 
expressions.     
2 The debate on such partition has evolved during the centuries up today (for a recent evolution of the discipline see, 
Husserl, 1973; Simons, 1991; Smith and Smith, 1995). However, in this work we will take into account only the 
thoughts of Aquinas and the medieval perspective on the subject, despite the fact that this classification has evolved and 
been partially criticised. However, a long discussion on the proper assignation of gnome to PR is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Future works could study the problem solving process with a holistic approach in order to blend virtuously 
euboulia and synesis or gnome and PR. 
3 Entrepreneurial orientation is typically characterized either by a three-dimensional concept where keys factors are 
innovation, risk-taking, proactivity (Miller, 1983) or by a more complex model where also autonomy and 
aggressiveness are added to the original three key factors (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Covin and Lumpkin, 2011). 
4 The study of synesis and its applications is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a judgment of alternatives 
(iudicio electionis) based on common sense contributes to structure the balance of fair routines, and thus it is clearly 
necessary to achieve prosperity and sustainability of a business, especially in more stable phases.  
5 The entrepreneurs here considered as ‘successful’ are not ‘categorically’ better than their peers. Rather their faculties 
of judgment are more oriented by gnome than synesis and thus in the composition of their virtue of PR as a potential 
whole, gnome plays a relevant role. In practical terms, it has been proved that successful entrepreneurs employ an 
approach similar to our model of judgment (Dew et al., 2009), confirming the foundation of our claims. We are thankful 
to one of the anonymous reviewers for the comment on this aspect. 
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6 For a review of the topic, see the special issue of 2011 “The Encyclical-letter ‘Caritas in Veritate’: Ethical Challenges 
for Business”, Journal of Business Ethics 100(supplement 1). 
7 This particular part of the study was possible thanks to the collaboration of some university lecturers in ancient and 
foreign languages (Biblical Greek, English, French, German, and Spanish) who have kindly participated in this project. 
Each lecturer offered suitable translations, either in English or in Italian, for the analysed paragraph. Then, the English 
lecturer together with the authors revised and corrected the nearest translations. 
8 We have found categories that may be similar to an extensive definition of PR (S.Th., IIª-IIae, q. 48, a.1). However, 
we also defined the function of gnome with regarding to PR and the borders of the two. Gnome governs an intellective 
act without a final command/execution. For the sake of clarity, in the definition of our dimensions, we have also 
reported terminology taken from the ‘Three-Dimensional wisdom scale’ (Clayton and Birren, 1980; Ardelt, 2004). This 
scale attempts to measure three characteristics of wise people: cognitive as knowledgeable, experienced, intelligent, 
pragmatic, and observant; affective as understanding, empathic, peaceful, and gentle; and reflective as introspective and 
intuitive. This classification, in fundamental terms, seems to replicate our findings. However, this scale refers to PR in 
general, thus it could lead to misleading interpretations of our dimensions that instead only refer to gnome or 
perspicacity.  
9 The model suggests that the first step of the judgment based on perspicacity is moral reasoning followed by moral 
sensitivity. However, in recent evolutions of the pertinent literature, this sequential approach has been criticised (e.g. 
Haidt, 2001; Zhong, 2011). Moral sensitivity is seen as an almost ‘instinctual’ reaction that later is channelled into a 
more conscious discourse thanks to the moral reasoning. Regardless of what sequence is assumed to be true, this does 
not invalidate our model. Both insights, coming from moral reasoning and sensitivity, are then recomposed into the 
personal-reflective dimension that creates final scenarios for each alternative, forming the base of moral imagination 
(Carroll, 1980; Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005).             
10 For a complete explanation of effectual logic, see Sarasvathy (2001) and Sarasvathy and Dew (2005). 
11 The entrepreneur was awarded the ‘Italian Entrepreneur of the Year’ in 2002. This event is sponsored and organized 
by the financial services company Ernst & Young. The selection criteria usually are: entrepreneurial spirit, performance, 
strategic leadership, global environmental impact, innovation, and personal integrity. The ‘Hall of Fame’ of this event 
can be viewed at <www.ey.com> 
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12 For this patent and his continuous commitment to innovation, Moretti-Polegato was nominated for a life-time 
achievement award at the European Inventor award ceremony in 2012, sponsored by CNBC in partnership with the 
Financial Times.  
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Figure list 
Figure 1 – Integral, Subjective, and Potential parts of Practical Reason  
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Figure 2 – Gnome and synesis: approaches to the act of judgment  
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Figure 3 – The three dimensions of judgment made on the basis of perspicacity     
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Table list  
 
Table 1 – Reconstruction of the concept of gnome    
Title of the book 
 
Translator/Author 
 
Translation 
 
English 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aristotle: 1968, 
Nicomachean Ethics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harris Rackham 
(integral text) 
“The quality termed Consideration in virtue of which men are 
said to be considerate, or to show consideration for others 
(forgiveness), is the faculty of judging correctly what is 
equitable. This is indicated by our saying that the equitable 
man is specially considerate of others (forgiving), and that it 
is equitable to show consideration for others (forgiveness) in 
certain cases; but consideration for others is that 
consideration which judges rightly what is equitable; judging 
rightly meaning judging what is truly equitable” (Rackham, 
1968) 
 
γνωμη  (gnome) = Consideration   
συγγνωμονας (syngnomonas) = Be considerate  
εχειν […] γνωμην (echein […] gnomen) = Show 
consideration for others (forgiveness) 
συγγνωμονικoν (syngnomonikon) = Considerate of others 
(forgiving) 
συγγνωμην  (sygnomen) =  Consideration for the others 
(Forgiveness)  
 συγγνωμη (sygnome) = Consideration for the other 
 
 
Aristotle: 1923, 
The Ethics of Aristotle 
 
James Edward 
Cowell Welldon 
 
Judgment or Consideration 
Considerate 
Show consideration 
Disposed to exercise kind consideration or forgiveness 
Consideration or forgiveness 
Forgiveness 
 
 
Aristotle: 1998, 
Nicomachean Ethics 
 
 
 
William David 
Ross 
 
Judgment 
Be sympathetic judges 
Have judgment 
Sympathetic judgment 
Sympathetic judgment 
Sympathetic judgment 
 
Aristotle: 2002, 
Nicomachean Ethics 
Christopher Rowe 
 
Sense 
Having a shared sense, sympathetic 
Have sense 
Inclined towards sympathy 
Sympathy 
To be sympathetic  
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Biblical Greek 
 
 
 
Ἀριστοτέλης 
: 1998, 
Ἠθικὰ  Νικομάχεια 
 
Direct translation 
of a lecturer of 
Ancient languages 
(using the original 
Greek text contained 
in the version of 
Ross) 
 
Comprehension/Discernment (Comprensione) 
Indulgent (indulgenti) 
That have comprehension/sympathy (che hanno 
comprensione) 
Inclined/Prone/Dispose towards indulgence/forgiveness 
(disposti all’indulgenza) 
Having indulgence/forgiveness (aver indulgenza)  
Indulgence/Forgiveness (indulgenza) 
 
French 
Aristote: 1824, 
L’Ethique à 
Nicomaque 
François Thurot 
 
Judgment/Discretion (jugement)  
Judicious (judicieux) 
Good sense (bon sens) 
Indulgent (indulgent) 
Character/Characteristic of indulgence/forgiveness (caractère 
d’indulgence) 
Indulgence/Forgiveness (indulgence)  
 
 
Aristote: 1970, 
L’Ethique à 
Nicomaque 
 
Rene Antoine 
Gauthier – Jean 
Yves Jolif 
 
Good Sense (bon sens) 
Benevolent (bienveillantes) 
Show (proof of) kindness/goodness (font prévue de bonté) 
Inclined/Prone/Dispose towards  kindness/goodness (enclin à 
la bonté) 
Be able to show (proof of) kindness/goodness (savoir faire 
prévue de bonté) 
[…] (word is not reported) 
 
Aristote: 1979, 
L’Ethique à 
Nicomaque 
Jules Tricot 
 
Judgment/Discretion (jugement) 
Good judgment (bon jugement)  
Have judgment/discretion (ont du jugement) 
Sympathetically/Favourably disposed towards others 
(favorablement disposé pour autrui)  
Tolerance/Broad-mindedness (largeur d’esprit)  
Tolerance/Broad-mindedness (largeur d’esprit)  
 
German 
Aristotele: 1911,  
Die Nikomachische 
Ethik 
Eugen Rolfes 
 
Gnome, Discretion or Distinction (Gnome, Diskretion oder 
Unterscheidung) 
Discrete/Sober  people (diskrete Personen) 
Have/Possess discretion (besitzen Diskretion) 
Especially prone (Excellent tendency) to indulgence/leniency 
(neigen vorzüglich zur Nachsicht) 
Indulgence/Leniency/Clemency (Nachsicht)  
Indulgence/Leniency/Clemency (Nachsicht)  
 
Aristotele: 2008,  
Die Nikomachische 
Ethik 
Adolf  Lasson 
 
Well-intentioned/disposed sentiments/attitude 
(wohlmeinende Gesinnung)  
Sage/Good-minded (wohldenkender)  
Wise man (einsichtiger Mann) 
Well-intentioned/disposed (wohlmeinend) 
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Indulgence/Leniency/Clemency (Nachsicht) 
Indulgent/Lenient/Clement judgment (nachsichtige  
Beurteilung) 
 
Italian 
Aristotele: 1949, 
L’etica Nicomachea Giacomo Dal Sasso 
 
Gnome 
Respectable/Moderate (perbene discreti) 
That have moderation/discretion (hanno discretezza) 
Sympathetic/Understanding (comprensivo) 
Comprehension/Sympathy (comprensione) 
Comprehension/Sympathy (comprensione) 
 
Aristotele: 1994, 
Etica Nicomachea 
Armando Plebe 
 
Capability of discernment (facoltà di discernimento) 
Moderate (discrete)  
Capability of discernment (facoltà di discernimento) 
Sympathetic/Understanding (comprensivo) 
Comprehension/Sympathy  (comprensione) 
Comprehension/Sympathy (comprensione)  
 
Aristotele: 1993, 
Etica Nicomachea 
Claudio Mazzarelli 
 
Comprehension/Discernment (comprensione) 
Indulgent (indulgent) 
That have comprehension (che hanno comprensione) 
Inclined/Prone/Dispose towards indulgence/forgiveness 
(disposto all’indulgenza) 
Having indulgence/forgiveness (avere indulgenza)  
Indulgence/Forgiveness (indulgenza) 
 
Aristotele: 1996, 
Etiche 
Lucia Caiani  
 
Good Sense (buon senso) 
Indulgent (indulgenti) 
Have good sense (hanno buon senso) 
Indulgent (indulgente) 
Having indulgence/forgiveness (avere indulgenza)  
Indulgence/Forgiveness (indulgenza) 
 
Lucia Caiani: 1998, 
Lettura all’“Etica 
Nicomachea” di 
Aristotele 
Lucia Caiani 
 
γνωμη (Gnome) 
Disposition by which one is called indulgent (unique 
translation of  two words) (disposizione per la quale si è detti 
indulgenti) 
Inclined/Prone/Dispose towards indulgence/forgiveness 
(incline all’indulgenza)  
Having indulgence/forgiveness (avere indulgenza)  
 
Aristotele: 1999, 
Etica Nicomachea Carlo Natali 
 
Consideration (considerazione) 
Reasonable/Sensible (ragionevoli) 
Having comprehension/sympathy (abbiamo comprensione)  
Sympathetic/Understanding (comprensivo) 
Comprehension/Sympathy  (comprensione) 
Comprehension/Sympathy (comprensione) 
 
Aristotele: 2002, 
Etica Nicomachea 
Marcello Zanatta 
 
Good sense (buon senso) 
Indulgent (indulgenti)  
That have good sense (che hanno buon senso) 
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Inclined/Prone/Dispose towards indulgence/forgiveness 
(incline all’indulgenza)  
Having indulgence/forgiveness (avere indulgenza) 
Indulgence (indulgenza) 
 
Spanish 
 
Aristóles: 1918, 
La Ética de  Aristóles 
 
Pedro Simón Abril 
 
Judgment or Opinion (sentencia o parecer) 
Have good sense/right judgment (tienen buen parecer) 
Judicious/Well-disposed men (hombres de buen parecer) 
Benign/Mild and merciful/compassionate (benigno y 
misericordioso) 
Having mercy/compassion (tener misericordia) 
Mercy/Compassion or Forgiveness/Clemency (misericordia o 
perdón) 
 
 
Aristóles: 1931, 
Ética a Nicòmaco  
 
 
Francisco Gallach 
Palés 
 
 
Judgment/Sense/Reason (juicio)  
Be good/well-disposed judges (son buenos jueces)   
Have judgment/sense/reason (tienen juicio)  
Men with good sense/good judgment, reasonable men 
(hombres de buen juicio) 
Goodness/Kindness of judging  (bondad de juicio)  
Good sense/good judgment  (buen juicio)  
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Table 2 – Summary of three dimensions of gnome   
 
Dimension 
 
 
Main Word(s)  
 
 
Means 
 
 
 
Knowledge dimension 
(Cognitive) 
 
 
γνωμη  (gnome) 
 
Capability of discernment; Comprehension; Consideration; 
Discernment; Good judgment; Good sense; Judgment; 
Reason; Sense  
 
 
 
 
External dimension 
(Affective) 
 
 
 
συγγνωμη(ν) 
(sygnome/sygnomen)  
 
 
Broad-mindedness; Character of indulgence or forgiveness; 
Clemency; Clement judgment; Compassion; Comprehension; 
Consideration for others; Consideration; Forgiveness; 
Goodness of judging; Honesty; Indulgence; Indulgent 
judgment; Kindness of judging; Leniency Lenient judgment; 
Loyalty; Mercy; Sympathetic judgment; Sympathy; 
Tolerance; Well-disposed sentiments; Well-intentioned 
attitude 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal dimension 
(Reflective)  
 
 
 
εχειν […] γνωμην (echein […] 
gnomen) 
συγγνώμονας (syngnomonas) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
συγγνωμην (sygnomen)  
συγγνωμονικόν 
(syngnomonikon)  
 
 
 
Personal ability to judge (personal interpretation of stimuli 
coming from knowledge/cognitive dimension) 
Be considerate; Be honest; Discrete; Good-minded; Have 
discretion; Have judgment; Have moderation; Have reason; 
Have right judgment; Have sense; Having a shared sense; 
Honest; Judicious; Moderate; Reasonable men; Respectable; 
Sage; Sober; Wise man  
 
Personal ability to relate to others (personal interpretation of 
stimuli coming from external/affective dimension) 
Be good judges; Be sympathetic judges; Be well-disposed 
judges; Benevolent; Benign; Compassionate; Considerate of 
others; Disposed to exercise kind consideration; Disposition 
by which one is called indulgent; Especially prone or 
Excellent tendency to indulgence; Fair person; Favourably 
disposed towards others; Forgiving; Inclined towards 
sympathy; Have compassion; Have comprehension; Have 
forgiveness; Have indulgence; Have mercy, Have sympathy; 
Inclined, Prone or Disposed towards forgiveness or 
indulgence; Indulgent; Loyal; Merciful; Mild; Sensible; Show 
and be able to show proof of  kindness; Show consideration 
for others; Sympathetic; Sympathetically disposed towards 
others; Understanding; Well-disposed; Well-intentioned  
 
 
